Trust, Control, and the Economics of Governance

Trust, Control, and the Economics of Governance

Herold, Philipp

Taylor & Francis Ltd






15 a 20 dias

Descrição não disponível.
1. Introduction 1.1. The Problem of Governing Cooperation 1.2. The Need for a Framework to Economize on Governance Devices 1.3. Structure of the Book 2. Understanding of Trustworthiness as an Intrinsic Institution 2.1. Trust: Expected Trustworthy Behavior 2.1.1. Encapsulated Interest as the Rational Choice Account of Trust 2.1.2. The Leap of Faith Account and Trust Propensity 2.1.3. Transaction Cost Economics and the Rationality of Trust 2.1.4. Agency Theory, Asymmetric Agency and Entrusting 2.2. Control: Non-Opportunism and Other Institutions 2.2.1. Non-Opportunism as a Feature of Trustworthiness 2.2.2. Non-Opportunism as an Intrinsic Institution 34 2.2.3. Opportunism and Empirical Conditions of Conventional' Institutions 2.3. On the Interplay of Trust and Control 2.3.1. Substitutes vs. Complements 2.3.2. Negative Indirect Effects: Crowding Out 2.3.3. Positive Indirect Effects: Crowding In 2.3.4. Framing determining Sign of Indirect Effect 3. The Proposed Heuristic 3.1. Trust Control Economics' as a Theoretical Framework 3.1.1. Theoretical Underpinnings and Choice of Host Discipline 3.1.2. Revisiting the Assumption Set 3.1.3. Trust Control Economics 3.1.4. On the Distinction between Extrinsic and Intrinsic Governance 3.2. The Extended Trust Sentence' as Pattern of Trust Relations 3.2.1. Recognizing the Empirical Conditions of the Trustee 3.2.2. Recognizing Control as an Element of Circumstances: Trustworthiness Accretion' 3.2.3. Social Capital, Enforcement Capital, and Trustees Trading in Freedom 3.2.4. The Negative Extended Trust Sentence 3.3. The Game of Trust and Control' as Application in Practice 3.3.1. Introduction 3.3.2. Building the Game 3.3.3. Possible Formalization of Non-Opportunism 3.3.4. On the Notion of Control 4. Use-Test of the Game of Trust and Control 4.1. Calibration of the Non-Opportunism Parameter in Practice 4.2. Information Intermediaries 4.2.1. General Aspects 4.2.2. Information Intermediaries within the Primary Game 4.2.3. On Sources for Indirect Signals/Cues 4.2.4. On the Information Intermediary as Executing Trustee 4.2.5. Limits to Information Intermediaries 4.3. Control Facilitator 4.3.1. General Aspects 4.3.2. Chain of Governance 4.3.3. (Sub-)Delegation and Remoteness 4.3.4. Limits of Control in Practice 4.3.5. Self-Commitment 4.4. Risk Bearer 4.4.1. General Aspects 4.4.2. On Sub-Delegation and Ultimate Liability 4.4.3. Limits to Risk Bearers 4.4.4. On the Inherent Tension of Trust Industries 5. Conceptual Evaluation of the Heuristic 5.1. Framework for Evaluation 5.2. Rigor vs. Relevance: Linking Theory and Problem 5.3. Abstraction vs. Re-Enrichment: Linking Theory and User 5.3.1. On the Heuristic Priming and Framing Trust Decisions 5.3.2. On the Heuristic Tapping Prior Knowledge 5.4. (Re-)Cognition: Linking User and Problem 5.4.1. On the Heuristic Addressing and Accommodating a Relevant Problem 5.4.2. On the Reasoning Resource Requirements of the Heuristic 6. Concluding Remarks 6.1. Results for Practical Implementation 6.1.1. Additions to the understanding of trust-control-problems 6.1.2. Additions to the decision making toolbox 6.2. Results Regarding the Conceptual Understanding 6.2.1. From the perspective of trust research 6.2.2. From the perspective of economics Publication bibliography Appendix: Game Theoretic Contributions to Formalizing Trust Problems Index